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Gaius Terentius Varro (ff. 216 BC, d. after 200 BC) was a Roman consul and commander. Along with his colleague, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, he commanded at the Battle of Cannae during the Second Punic War, in 216 BC, against the Carthaginian general Hannibal. The battle proved to be a decisive Roman defeat.

He had been a praetor in 218 BC, was proconsul in Picenum from 215–213 BC, and as propraetor, in 208–207 BC, he held Etruria against Hannibal's younger brother Hasdrubal Barca. He went to Africa, in 200 BC as ambassador.

Life

He is represented as having risen from a humble background. The Roman historian Livy, writing two centuries after the fact, tells us that according to "tradition … his father was a butcher who hawked his meat about and employed his son in the menial drudgery of his trade." He was the first of his plebian family, the Terentii Varrones, to be elected consul. He had a son Aulus "who as praetor and then proconsul held Nearer Spain in 184–182".

Livy:

"The money made in this business was left to his son, who hoped that his fortune might help him to a more respectable position in society. He decided to become an advocate, and his appearances in the Forum, where he defended men of the lowest class by noisy and scurrilous attacks upon the property and character of respectable citizens, brought him into notoriety and ultimately into office. After discharging the various duties of the quaestorship, the two aedileships, plebeian and curule, and lastly those of the praetor, he now aspired to the consulship."

• According to Appian he was " a demagogue who had won popular favor by the usual high-sounding promises."

• One of the leaders (along with Sp. Lucretius and Cn. Octavius) of an embassy to Carthage and Masinissa in Numidia, in 200 BC.

• One of the commisioners (along with T. Quinctius Flamininus and P. Cornelius, the son of Cnaeus Scipio), appointed to replentish the colonists lost at Venusia, as a result of the war with Carthage.

Consular elections of 216 BC

Livy:

"(216 B.C.) Servilius and Regulus had their commands extended for another year. The interreges appointed by the senate were C. Claudius Cento, son of Appius, and P. Cornelius Asina. The latter conducted the elections amidst a bitter struggle between the patricians and the plebs. C. Terentius Varro, a member of their own order, had ingratiated himself with the plebs by his attacks upon the leading men in the State and by all the tricks known to the demagogue. His success in shaking the influence of Fabius and weakening the authority of the Dictator had invested him with a certain glory in the eyes of the mob, which was heightened by the other's unpopularity, and they did their utmost to raise him to the consulship. The patricians opposed him with their utmost strength, dreading lest it should become a common practice for men to attack them as a means of rising to an equality with them." Q. Baebius Herennius, a relation of Varro's, accused not only the senate, but even the augurs, because they had prevented the Dictator from carrying the elections through, and by thus embittering public opinion against them, he strengthened the feeling in favour of his own candidate. "It was by the nobility," he declared, "who had for many years been trying to get up a war, that Hannibal was brought into Italy, and when the war might have been brought to a close, it was they who were unscrupulously protracting it. The advantage which M. Minucius gained in the absence of Fabius made it abundantly clear that with four legions combined, a successful fight could be maintained, but afterwards two legions had been exposed to slaughter at the hands of the enemy, and then rescued at the very last moment in order that he might be called 'Father' and 'Patron' because he would not allow the Romans to conquer before they had been defeated. Then as to the consuls; though they had it in their power to finish the war they had adopted Fabius' policy and protracted it. This is the secret understanding that has been come to by all the nobles, and we shall never see the end of the war till we have elected as our consul a man who is really a plebeian, that is, one from the ranks. The plebeian nobility have all been initiated into the same mysteries; when they are no longer looked down upon by the patricians, they at once begin to look down upon the plebs. Who does not see that their one aim and object was to bring about an interregnum in order that the elections might be controlled by the patricians? That was the object of the consuls in both staying with the army; then, afterwards, because they had to nominate a Dictator against their will to conduct the elections, they had carried their point by force, and the Dictator's appointment was declared invalid by the augurs. Well, they have got their interregnum; one consulship at all events belongs to the Roman plebs; the people will freely dispose of it and give it to the man who prefers an early victory to prolonged command.""

"Harangues like these kindled intense excitement amongst the plebs. There were three patrician candidates in the field, P. Cornelius Merenda, L. Manlius Vulso, and M. Aemilius Lepidus; two plebeians who were now ennobled, C. Atilius Serranus and Q. Aelius Paetus, one of whom was a pontiff, the other an augur. But the only one elected was C. Terentius Varro, so that the elections for appointing his colleague were in his hands. The nobility saw that his rivals were not strong enough, and they compelled L. Aemilius Paulus to come forward. He had come off with a blasted reputation from the trial in which his colleague had been found guilty, and he narrowly escaped, and for a long time stoutly resisted the proposal to become a candidate owing to his intense dislike of the plebs. On the next election day, after all Varro's opponents had retired, he was given to him not so much to be his colleague as to oppose him on equal terms."

Appian:

"The Romans, distressed by the magnitude of the disasters to [Gaius] Flaminius and [Gaius] Centenius, and considering such a succession of surprising defeats unworthy of their dignity, and that a war within their own territory was not to be tolerated, and furious against Hannibal, levied four new legions in the city to serve against him, and hurried the allied forces from all quarters to Apulia. As consuls they chose Lucius Aemilius [Paullus], who had acquired military fame in the war against the Illyrians, and [Gaius] Terentius Varro, a demagogue who had won popular favor by the usual high-sounding promises."

Battle of Cannae

Main article: Battle of Cannae

Preperations

Livy:

"Before they marched out of the City, Varro delivered several violent harangues, in which he declared that the war had been brought into Italy by the nobles, and would continue to feed on the vitals of the republic if there were more generals like Fabius; he, Varro, would finish off the war the very day he caught sight of the enemy. His colleague, Paulus, made only one speech, in which there was much more truth than the people cared to hear. He passed no strictures on Varro, but he did express surprise that any general, whilst still in the City before he had taken up his command, or become acquainted with either his own army or that of the enemy, or gained any information as to the lie of the country and the nature of the ground, should know in what way he should conduct the campaign and be able to foretell the day on which he would fight a decisive battle with the enemy. "

Appian:

"When they sent the consuls forward they begged them as they were leaving the city to end the war by battle, and not to exhaust the city by delay, by conscriptions, by taxes, and by hunger and idleness due to the devastation of the fields. The consuls on taking command of the army in Apulia had altogether 70,000 foot and 6,000 horse, and they encamped near a village called Cannae.

"Hannibal's camp was nearby. Hannibal, who was always ready to fight and impatient of idleness, was especially so now because he was troubled lest his supplies should fail, for which reason he continually offered battle. He feared also lest his mercenaries should desert him, as they had not received their pay, or disperse through the country in search of food. For this reason he challenged the enemy daily."

"The opinions of the consuls were diverse. Aemilius thought that it was best to exhaust Hannibal by delay, as he could not hold out long for want of provisions, rather than come to an engagement with a general so skilled in war and an army so accustomed to victory. But Varro, like the demagogue he was, reminded his colleague of the charge which the people had laid upon them at their departure, that they should bring matters to a speedy decision by battle. [Gnaeus] Servilius [Geminus], the consul of the previous year, who was still present, alone sustained the opinion of Aemilius. All the senators and the knights who held offices in the army agreed with Varro.

"While they were still disputing, Hannibal set upon some detachments of theirs that were collecting wood and forage, and he pretended to be defeated, and about the last watch put the bulk of his army in motion as if in retreat. Varro, seeing this, led out the army with the thought of pursuing Hannibal in his flight. Aemilius even then forbade the movement, and as Varro did not obey, he consulted the omens alone, according to the Roman custom, and sent word to Varro, just as he was starting, that the day was unpropitious. The latter thereupon came back, not venturing to disregard the omen, but he tore his hair in the sight of the whole army, and cried out that victory had been snatched from him by the envy of his colleague; and the whole crowd shared his anger."

"Hannibal, when his scheme failed, returned forth-with to his camp, thus showing that his retreat was feigned, but this did not teach Varro to suspect every movement of Hannibal. Hurrying armed as he was to the headquarters, he complained in the presence of senators, centurions, and tribunes that Aemilius had made a pretense about the omen in order to snatch a sure victory from the city, either hesitating from cowardice or moved by jealousy toward himself.

"While he was thus venting his wrath the soldiers standing around the tent listened to him and joined in the censure of Aemilius. The latter nevertheless continued to give good advice to those within, but in vain. When all the others, Servilius alone excepted, sided with Varro, he yielded, and on the following day he himself drew up the army in order of battle as commander, for Varro yielded to him that title. Hannibal perceived the movement but he did not come out of his camp because he was not quite ready for battle."

Aftermath

Appian:

"Some of those who escaped from the battle and who had taken refuge in the larger camp and in the evening had chosen Publius Sempronius as their general, forced a passage through Hannibal's guards, who were exhausted by weariness and want of sleep. These men, to the number of about 10,000, made their way to Canusium about midnight. But the 5000 in the smaller camp were captured by Hannibal the following day. Varro, having collected the remains of the army and sought to revive their fainting spirits, put them under the command of Scipio, one of the military tribunes, and himself hastened to Rome."

Columbia Encyclopedia:

After the battle of Cannae, he "rallied the remnants of his army at nearby Canusium (now Canosa di Puglia). He received official commendation from the senate."

Quotes

[1]

• For you are mistaken, Lucius Paulus, if you imagine that you will have a less violent contest with Gaius Terentius than with Hannibal
  • Livy Book XXII Chapter 39: Fabius speaks to Paulus

References

• Appian, The Foreign Wars: "The Hannibalic War". (ed. Horace White). New York. THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 1899.
• Daly, Gregory, Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, Routledge; 1 edition (November 13, 2003). ISBN 0415327431.
• Hammond, N. G. L., and H. H. Scullard (editors), The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Oxford University Press. (1970). "Varro, GaiusTerentius" p. 1107.
• Livy, History of Rome, Rev. Canon Roberts (translator), Ernest Rhys (Ed.); (1905) London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.
• Palmer, Robert E. A., Rome and Carthage at Peace. F. Steiner, (1997). ISBN 3515070400.
• Polybius, Histories, Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (translator); London, New York. Macmillan (1889); Reprint Bloomington (1962).